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On Protecting Privacy in the Cloud 
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Cloud computing has now emerged as popular computing paradigm for data storage and computation for enterprises 
and individuals. Its major characteristics include the pay-per-use pricing model, where users pay only for the resources 
they consume with no upfront cost for hardware/software infrastructures, and the capability of providing scalable and 
unlimited storage and computation resources to meet changing business needs of enterprises with minimal management 
overhead [1]. The cloud, however, presents a major limitation to enterprises and individuals who move to public clouds: 
they lose control over the systems that manage their data and applications, leading to increased security and privacy 
concerns [2,3,4].  
In this article, we examine cloud privacy concerns, and provide an overview of current and emerging solutions for 
protecting privacy of data and applications deployed in the cloud. Based on this, we suggest a set of recommendations 
for practitioners and researchers to improve privacy protection of cloud users. 
 
What is privacy? 
Roger Clarke (2006) [5] provides a broad definition of privacy spanning four dimensions: 
i. Privacy of personal information, sometimes referred to as "data privacy". This covers the right to control 
when, where, how, to whom, and to what extent an individual shares their personal information, as well as the 
right to access personal information given to others, to correct it, and to ensure it is safeguarded and disposed 
of appropriately; 
ii. Privacy of personal behavior, which covers the right of individuals to keep any knowledge of their activities 
from being shared with others; 
iii. Privacy of personal communications, which covers the right to communicate without undue surveillance, 
monitoring, or censorship; 
iv. Privacy of the person, which is concerned with the integrity of an individual's body. It covers such things as 
requiring the person's consent before applying medical treatments or taking samples of body fluids. 
This article concerns the first dimension in a cloud computing setting; to ensure that the additional actors introduced 
by the use of the cloud, do not abuse cloud users' data. 
 
Cloud Privacy Concerns  
Understanding privacy concerns in a cloud computing model requires understanding the key stakeholders involved in 
its data lifecycle:  
• Data owners are the entities whose data is stored in the cloud. For examples, in a critical application domain 
such as healthcare, they include patients when healthcare providers outsource the storage of their medical 
databases to the cloud, but also the physicians and the hospitals whose medical and financial practices can be 
inferred by analyzing the outsourced data. The main concern of data owners is to protect their data and identities 
against unauthorized access or use; 
• Data consumers are the persons who query the data for various reasons, such as physicians who consult the 
medical data of patients for treatments, researchers who query the patients' data to determine the side effects of 
a given medicine. Data consumers may also have privacy concerns, for example, a researcher who is working 
on a new scientific invention may require his or her identity and queries (about his or her research) to be 
protected; and 	
• Service or cloud providers include all IT staff required to run and manage cloud services, including databases, 
servers, networks and applications software.	
We illustrate two key privacy concerns  for data owners and consumers in the cloud using examples from the 
healthcare domain. 
Accidental or deliberate data disclosure: One source of privacy concerns is the cloud's administrators, who may be  
external entities for both data owners and consumers. They may accidentally or deliberately disclose the data, with 
unwelcome consequences. For example, in the healthcare domain, sensitive information such as patients’ illnesses, 
unsuccessful medical interventions of healthcare professionals, and ongoing inventions of medical researchers can be 
identified and revealed with irreversible damage to patients, physicians and researchers. This information could be 
abused by different bodies, including employers, insurance companies and competitors. Indeed, the mere existence of 
such data may make some cloud administrators vulnerable to corruption or blackmail.  
Of course traditional, non-cloud information systems have also been vulnerable to such privacy concerns, such as 
healthcare provider who store their medical data on their premises. However, the privacy risks and effects are 
significantly amplified by using the cloud: when a cloud managing the medical data of several healthcare providers is 
compromised, it is the entire medical history of a patient, aggregated across multiple healthcare providers, that is at 
stake, not only one single healthcare episode at a specific healthcare provider. In many ways, data is the currency of the 
21st century and cloud-based data stores are the bank vaults, making them an increasingly preferred target for both 
malicious insiders and external attackers due to the collective value concentrated in one logical location. 
Beneficial or harmful data mining: Medical histories of patients, aggregated across multiple healthcare providers that 
use the same cloud, may be mined to infer new knowledge that is beneficial to society as whole and to individual 
patients. For example, the predisposition of a certain category of people to a particular disease could be determined by 
analyzing common features of those suffering form that disease; healthcare professionals with illegal or criminal 
practices (e.g., physicians undertaking unusually high numbers of abortions, serial-killing nurses, etc.) can be identified, 
and so on. These medical histories may also be analyzed for malicious purposes, such as deliberate undermining of a 
physician’s reputation by aggregating the number of his/her unsuccessful medical interventions, determining cheap and 
expensive healthcare providers for advertisement purposes, etc. An important privacy management aim, therefore, is to 
prevent cloud insiders from performing such harmful actions. 
 
Current practices for privacy protection in the cloud  
Adherence to agreed privacy policies is a de facto norm for addressing the above privacy concerns. Typically, an 
organization that outsources all or part of its information system to an external cloud signs a service level agreement 
with the cloud provider. The agreement defines, among other things, a privacy policy prescribing where and how the 
organization's data is stored, processed and used (i.e. accepted and prohibited uses) by the cloud service provider. It 
may also define some privacy related measures and technical controls to be applied on the cloud side, such as the vetting 
of employees, breach notification, isolation of tenant applications, and the use of products certified to meet national or 
international standards. However, with the lack of physical control by cloud users over data storage, and the absence of 
standardized and mature techniques for monitoring how data is accessed, processed and used inside the cloud, it is 
harder to verify a cloud’s compliance with such privacy policies. 
 
Emerging Solutions  
We examine below some emerging approaches for enhancing the privacy of data owners and consumers in the cloud. 
We classify them, according to the kind of techniques they employ, in Table-1 into four categories: Encryption, Trusted 
Computing, Private Information Retrieval (PIR), and Intention hiding.  
Encryption. Encryption is a viable technique for protecting sensitive data from malicious cloud insiders. However, it 
also makes it difficult for the cloud to process queries on data on behalf of users. This limitation is being addressed by 
emerging approaches: 
• Homomorphic Encryption: Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [7] is a promising technique that enables 
cloud servers to perform computations on encrypted data, without decrypting it. Although this is still 
prohibitively expensive to be applied to real-world applications, this is an area of ongoing research and 
development. 
• Partial Homomorphic Encryption:  Also known as Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) [8], it allows 
the cloud to perform only a limited number of operations on encrypted data, leading to improved performance. 
Even though SHE schemes are less powerful than FHE schemes, they can already be used in many real-world 
applications in the medical, financial, and advertising domains.  
• Efficient Query-specific Encryption: This kind of encryption techniques [6,9] are designed to allow the cloud 
to efficiently execute specific classes of queries such as keyword search queries, range queries, and 
aggregation queries without decrypting the data. For example, for answering (multi-dimensional) range 
queries, a combination of encryption and data partitioning techniques can be used to organize data elements 
into ‘buckets’ that can be stored safely in a public cloud [9]. The solution requires clients (i.e. data owners) to 
participate in the query processing by selecting relevant buckets (to be retrieved from the cloud) and filtering 
away false positives. Similarly, a technique for keyword queries proposed by Cao, et al [6] allows the cloud to 
rank a set of encrypted documents based on how well they match a set of encrypted keywords. 
Trusted Computing: An interesting alternative to expensive encryption is to store and process plaintext data inside 
secured-hardware containers deployed in untrusted clouds. Computation inside such trusted hardware is orders of 
magnitude cheaper than any equivalent cryptography performed on untrusted clouds, despite the overall greater 
acquisition cost of secure hardware. Cipherbase [12] is an example of a database system that relies on secure 
cryptographic co-processors and FPGA boards to process privacy sensitive data. The user can tune the hardware to 
provide different privacy/performance trade-offs. Its performance is practical for a wide range of applications, for 
example, when all data is strongly encrypted, the performance drops by only one order of magnitude compared to when 
data is processed by a conventional database system operating on plaintext data.  
Efficient Private Information Retrieval (PIR): The idea behind PIR techniques is to execute private queries on a remote 
server without letting the server learn anything about executed queries or their results. They can therefore be used to 
address the privacy concerns of data consumers. Although original PIR solutions were too computationally expensive 
to be practical, their efficiency can be substantially improved by applying their expensive cryptographic operations only 
on a subset of the data elements that contain queries’ answers instead of the entire database [10].  
Intention hiding techniques: Another new trend for protecting the privacy of data consumers is to hide the intention 
behind their queries by changing the query plans [14]. Such approaches are motivated by the observation that different 
(but equivalent) plans for the same SQL query may reveal vastly different information about the user’s intention. 
Therefore, they exploit query optimization techniques to accommodate the privacy constraints and preferences of users 
and produce privacy-aware query execution plans. 
 
Table 1: Emerging solutions for privacy protection in the cloud 
Approach Supported Queries Privacy Strength Limitations 
Encryption [6,7,8,9] 
Homomorphic 
Encryption [7] All types of queries Strong 
- Impractical for real-life applications due to 
prohibitive computation cost. 
Partial Homomorphic 
Encryption [8] 
Keyword search 
queries Strong 
- Not all queries are supported, 
- Only practical for applications with moderate    
dataset sizes. 
Query-specific 
Encryption [6,9] 
Keyword search 
queries [6] Strong 
- Substantial computation overhead for data 
owners, 
- Not all queries are supported.  
Range queries [9] 
Practical,  
Tuneable to achieve a 
privacy/efficiency 
trade-off. 
- Part of query computation overhead is shifted    
to data owners, 
- The cloud's computation power is under used, 
- Support to range queries only. 
Trusted computing [12,13] 
All types of queries 
[12] 
Practical, 
Tuneable to achieve a 
privacy/efficiency 
trade-off. 
- Expensive secure hardware, 
- Requires secret key handover from user to 
trusted  hardware, 
- Not all queries are supported (in [13]) 
Range and keyword 
queries [13] 
Efficient PIR [10] Range and join queries 
Practical,  
Tuneable to achieve a 
privacy/efficiency 
trade-off. 
- Part of query computation overhead is shifted    
to data owners, 
Intention hiding techniques [14] Join queries 
Good for hybrid 
clouds 
- Users are required to have a good knowledge    
of the servers involved in processing their    
queries. 
 
	
A Call to Action 
Table-1 demonstrates that there are many solutions with different trade-offs in terms of privacy protection, performance, 
computation overheads to users, and the range of supported queries. Given this rich landscape of solutions, we suggest 
the following sets of actions to improve the privacy protection in the cloud, aimed at practitioners and researchers. 
For practitioners  
• Match requirements to solutions. Cloud application developers should select the solution that most closely satisfies 
the requirements of their applications. For example, for document-oriented applications, such as email 
management and medical records privacy protection, encryption techniques for keyword search queries would be 
more secure than policy-based solutions, more efficient than full encryption techniques, and less expensive than 
trusted computing techniques. On the other hand, Online Transaction Processing (OLTP) applications, such as 
banking, require high performance and	throughputs, so trusted computing solutions would be more appropriate; 
• Audit and Verify. Cloud and service providers should offer data owners and consumers verifiable auditing 
mechanisms that would discourage malicious cloud insiders from data abuse. Cloud users should continually 
analyze the security and privacy controls of a cloud provider and verify that their security and privacy requirements 
are met. 
For researchers  
• In the short term, efforts are needed to improve the visibility of users inside cloud computing. Solutions are needed 
to allow cloud users to monitor, audit and control, with minimal overhead, their data flows, as well as to measure 
how well a cloud provider adheres to its stated privacy policies. 
• In the long term, with data encryption research making promising progress, efficiency of query computation over 
encrypted data should be improved to make it practical for real OLTP applications. 
 
Conclusion 
Although privacy is regarded as a significant hurdle for wide adoption of cloud computing, it can also become one 
of its key selling features if addressed properly. Users involvement in protecting their privacy, by enabling them to 
control and verify how their data is stored, accessed and exploited, is essential for even greater adoption.   
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